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JUDICIAL POLITICS: MAKING THE CASE FOR MERIT
SELECTION
Steven Zeidman*
I am delighted to be here. If you will bear with me, indulge me
just a little bit of a personal reflection. Prior to coming to CUNY
Law School, I was the Executive Director of The Fund for Modern
Courts, a court reform, non-partisan, statewide organization.'
About five years ago, we were trying to figure out how to honor the
memory of a former judge of the Court of Appeals, Hugh Jones.2 A
group of us got together and thought: 'Well, Hugh Jones was a real
intellectual, in many ways a giant of the Court of Appeals-maybe
we should create a lecture series with judges talking about issues
affecting the judiciary." We realized pretty soon that we needed
some help to make this a reality. Albany Law School, through its
then-Dean Thomas Sponsler, enthusiastically agreed to be a co-
sponsor. Out of that collaboration was born the annual Judge Hugh
R. Jones Memorial Lecture at Albany Law School. So, for me it is
full circle and especially delightful to be here talking about issues
affecting the judiciary. I thank the Albany Law Review for inviting
me.
Judicial selection: it is a wonderful opportunity to talk in an
academic setting about something that is far from academic. It
certainly can be, but if right now you went into LexisNexis,
Westlaw, Google, and the Index to Legal Periodicals, whatever
works for you, and typed in "Judicial Selection Reform," you would
get buried in an avalanche of articles, probably from all fifty states.3
* Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law. J.D., 1981, Duke University School of Law. I
am grateful for the insightful comments and editorial assistance of Maria Catalina Curbelo
and Robert Mandelbaum.
See THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, at www.moderncourts.org (last visited Feb. 22,
2005).
2 The Albany Law Review devoted an issue to Judge Jones, 65 ALB. L. REV. 1-15 (2001),
who delivered the oft-cited lecture, Cogitations on Appellate Decision-Making. See Hon. Hugh
R. Jones, Cogitations on Appellate Decision-Making, 34 REC. ASS'N B. CITY OF N.Y. 543 (1979).
' See, e.g., Selecting a Justice, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., June 2, 2004, at 1; Leonard Post,
Judicial Selection Reform Stumbles: New Study Shows Limited Progress, NAT'L L.J., May 3,
2004, at 1; Judge Jay A. Daugherty, Keep Partisan Politics Out of the Judicial Branch, DAILY
RECORD (ST. LOUIS), May 1, 2004, at 1; John Zimmerman, Using Ballot to Put Judges on
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Judicial selection is on the national radar screen. There is so much
going on at so many levels. For me, the main issue-the issue that I
care most about-is whether to elect or to appoint our judges. How
do we want to create a judiciary? That is what I will address.
More specifically, where do our judges come from? Or, putting it
more relevantly for those who aspire to the bench, how do you
become a judge? I suggest to the students here that this is
something you should be thinking about. If judges in your
jurisdiction are elected, you should begin, quickly, becoming
politically active. If judges are appointed, you should start to figure
out how those systems operate. I suggest to those with judicial
ambitions that it is far from too early for you to begin thinking
about these issues.
So, where do we start? I think by asking: what kind of a judiciary
do we want? And within that: what do we expect from the
individuals who comprise this ideal judiciary? Certain things, I am
sure, feel very obvious. Regardless of the system used to select
judges, we can agree that our judges should be smart. That is easy
enough to state in principle, but how do we measure intelligence?
Law school grades? LSAT scores? SATs? How about an exam-a
judge test or some kind of certification procedure?4 We could send
judicial aspirants to pre-judge schools and see how they perform.'
The simple truth is that trying to measure intelligence is harder
than it might, at first blush, appear. Think about other
characteristics of the ideal judge, such as integrity and
industriousness. How can we ascertain whether someone has the
requisite amount of those attributes? That is part of the challenge,
and I think that is why we have to figure out what the best system
Bench Leads to Host of Difficulties, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Feb. 22, 2004, at 18; Michael J.
Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as . . . Talk Radio, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 909 (2005); Susie M.
Dosik, Alaska's Merit Selection for Judges, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 305 (2004); Gerald Stern, The
Changing Face of Judicial Elections, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1507 (2004); Perspectives: Judicial
Elections Versus Merit Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 763-842 (2004). The United States is not
the only country wrestling with judicial selection issues. See, e.g., Court to Select Judges from
Ranks of Lawyers, Prosecutors, KOREA TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004; Baradan Kuppusamy, Ex-Judge
Urges Reform of Judicial Selection, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at 11; Clare Dyer,
Selection of Judges Condemned as Biased, GUARDIAN (LONDON), July 2, 2004, at 3.
4 See, e.g., Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the
Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1226 (2000) (suggesting that "states consider developing
special examinations to be administered to all judicial aspirants"); John H. Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) (discussing the judicial
certification process used in Germany).
See, e.g., Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 869 (2002)
("[p]rospective judges in many other countries are trained for the demands and
responsibilities of judging at an early point in their careers").
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is to try and get us there. Let me suggest that ultimately-and
again, these may seem like trite phrases, but I want to try and
make them more textured-ultimately, two scholars got it just right
when they said that the goal, as we think about creating a judiciary,
is to produce "a qualified, inclusive and independent judiciary. 6
Qualified, inclusive, and independent. Which system, elective or
appointive, do you think is more likely to yield a qualified, inclusive,
and independent judiciary?
Let's start with the elective system. For many, political elections
are hardly synonymous with independence. To them, the phrase
"judicial elections" is anathema; it should not be in our legal system
let alone our lexicon. You have heard today in great detail how
judicial elections throughout this country have evolved. Twenty-
maybe twenty-five-years ago, they did not resemble the worst sort
of campaigns and elections that have become the norm for other
elective positions, but more and more that is what they are
becoming.7 The vitriolic name-calling, the attack ads, the million-
dollar fundraising, the influence of special interest groups-all are
rapidly making judicial elections indistinguishable from other
campaigns. Hardly anyone thinks this is a good thing. And, of
course, as you have heard, judicial political campaigns, even as they
begin to resemble all these other campaigns, still have their own
unique issues. Can and should judicial candidates be allowed to
give opinions on legal issues, express how they would rule, or make
promises? Should they be able to campaign and attempt to curry
favor with the electorate like any other politician? These issues,
unique to judicial elections, have to give us great pause. You have
already heard today about how the Supreme Court interpreted
Minnesota's judicial campaign rules that restricted judicial
candidates.8  We are still experiencing the aftermath of that
decision, but I recommend that it is worth your time to go back and
read the Court's opinion carefully. While the Court discusses
whether judicial candidates can announce their positions on legal
issues, and, as a result, views the case through the lens of judicial
elections, by no means should you assume that the Court was
somehow giving a stamp of approval, sanctioning, or welcoming
6 James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the Organized Bar in State Judicial
Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV. 683, 693 (2002).
Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in New York
City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 821 (2004).
8 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding
unconstitutional a state canon prohibiting judicial candidates "from announcing their views
on disputed legal and political issues").
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judicial elections.9 Far from it. I might be reading into it a little too
much because it tends to comport with the way I think about
judicial elections, but it seems to me as you read the case and you
read the concurring opinions, the Court almost is saying: "Listen,
you made your bed, now sleep in it. If you want to elect judges, you
have to deal with the consequences." That, to me, is the
undercurrent and raises the issue: do we have to live with the
consequences? That is the issue we face today.
Apparently, in New York State-and I am sure I am being wildly
optimistic-but I do not think that we do have to live with the
consequences. Why do I say that? It was similar anti-judicial
election sentiment about twenty-five years ago that led to a
fundamental change in the way we select judges to our Court of
Appeals. Change happened. To all the naysayers, I repeat: it
happened. We changed the way, in our lifetime, that we select
judges to the Court of Appeals. New York switched from elections
to an appointive system." Is the appointive system ideal? Hardly.
More important to ask is whether it is superior to elections. No
doubt. In fact, not coincidentally, shortly after switching from
elections to appointments we saw the first woman, Judith Kaye, join
the Court of Appeals. 12 This was hardly a coincidence, and I will
come back to the issue of diversity, or inclusiveness, momentarily.
Back to elections. I am putting to the side, because so many
people have talked about them so eloquently, the general
applicability of elections to judicial candidates and whether judges
are different-have different functions-than other popularly
elected officials. 3 I am also putting aside how we feel about having
judges face re-election campaigns after ruling on controversial
cases. And, parenthetically, a word about so-called retention
9 See id. at 788-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (cautioning about the various pitfalls
associated with judicial elections).
'0 See Zeidman, supra note 7, at 797 & n.29.
11 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(e) (amended 1977); see also George Bundy Smith, Choosing
Judges for a State's Highest Court, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1493, 1493-94 (1998).
12 Judge Kaye was appointed to the Court of Appeals in 1983 by Governor Cuomo. See,
e.g., The Task Force on Judicial Selection, Recommendations on the Selection of Judges and
the Improvement of the Judicial System in New York, 58 REC. ASS'N B. CITY OF N.Y. 374, 402
n.138 (2003) (citing John Caher, Few Appellate Judges Apply for Wesley's Seat: Potential
Candidates Say They Presume Governor's Choice is Foregone Conclusion, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18,
2003, at 1). Judge Kaye was appointed Chief Judge in 1993.
13 See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 287 (2002)
('Members of the judicial branch.., are not direct representatives of the people, but are
expected to act as impartial arbiters of cases and controversies.").
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elections. 4 There has been so much-too much-focus on the initial
election. I ask you to look inside yourself and imagine you are a
judge and have before you a case of great importance and
contentiousness-one that is dividing the people in your
community. Pick whatever issue you want, but make it particularly
difficult, and you know that in six months you are up for re-election.
Will that affect how you rule? There are certain truths we just have
to confront. These are some of the realities within which this whole
discussion takes place, yet I even want to put those problems of
elections to the side. I also want to put to the side the fact that
every judge in our federal judiciary is appointed. 5 I have yet to
hear anyone clamoring for the right to elect judges to the federal
bench. Putting all of that to the side, even the underlying rationale
for judicial elections is flawed. Now, maybe you knew nothing about
these issues prior to coming here today, but you did know one thing:
why people suggest we should elect judges. You know the answer to
that. Because-I think someone earlier mentioned the lessons of
third grade civics classes-it goes to the heart of democracy and
accountability: the input of the citizenry.16 On its face it is very
hard to argue with. It certainly sounds very un-American, if
nothing else, to say: "Who cares about the citizenry and civic
participation?" Here is the problem. To inform this particular issue
in the debate, to insert empirical data into the equation, I examined
twenty-five years of judicial elections and appointments in New
York City.'7 I was most interested in trying to get my arms around
voting behavior in New York City. Citizens have this wonderful
opportunity, this right, to impact the judiciary. What do they do
with it? And that is empirical; it is something you can get your
hands on. The bottom line is that voters in New York City-and I
think this is true throughout the country-know virtually nothing
about their judicial candidates.' 8 How do we know that? We know
that by numerous exit surveys that have been conducted over the
years, but beyond that, not surprisingly, they simply do not vote.' 9
In the 2002 New York City elections, the average percentage of
registered voters who pulled a lever for a judicial candidate was
" For a discussion of retention elections, see Honorable B. Michael Dann & Randall M.
Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429 (2001).
15 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (2000).
16 Zeidman, supra note 7, at 818-19.
7 See generally Zeidman, supra note 7.




typically between fifteen and twenty percent.20  Hardly the
embodiment of civic participation and influence. The fact is that no
one is voting for their judges. We just have to acknowledge that.
Nobody is voting, and I do not think the New York City picture is
unique.
The result? Certainly in New York City, the result is that judicial
elections, for all practical purposes, vest judicial selection with
political party leaders. Once you get the party's nomination, believe
21me, you are in. Whether it is because no one is running against
you or because you have been cross-endorsed by agreement of party
bosses, the simple fact is that the party nomination is tantamount
to victory. One result is the theme pervading the public opinion
surveys we have been hearing about. It may sound hyperbolic, but
there is, in fact, a crisis of confidence in the justice system. Some of
the survey questions go to this very point: that people feel like the
judiciary and the way judges are picked are unduly influenced by
political party leaders and bosses.2  And again, focusing on New
York City, for those of you who are following what has been going
on in Brooklyn, we have seen widespread allegations of pernicious
and longstanding political party domination and corruption of
judicial elections.23 It may be that we are just seeing the tip of the
iceberg.
What is the better system? Appointment by what is called merit
selection. Dr. Cheek said he is not here on the panel as an
advocate. I think that is what I was supposed to be, an advocate. I
willingly take on that role. Merit selection, I think, makes much
more sense. What do I mean by merit selection? In a very quick
20 Id. at 823-25.
2 "I'm against elected judges because the way you get elected judges is the way they do it
in the Bronx. You get three political leaders together, boom, they pick a guy and he's the
judge, he's elected." New York State Commission on Government Integrity, Restoring the
Public Trust: A Blueprint for Government Integrity, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 173, 185 (1990)
(quoting then-New York State Governor Mario Cuomo).
22 See Zeidman, supra note 7, at 820 & n.125 (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 42 (1999), at http://
www.ncsconline.org[WC/Publications/Res.AmtPTC-PublicViewCrtsPub.pdf (last visited Feb.
20, 2005)).
23 See, e.g., John Caher, Assembly Acts on Reform of Judicial Screening Process, Fund
Raising, N.Y.L.J., June 16, 2004, at 1 (tracking the progress of legislation aimed at restoring
confidence in the judiciary after scandals involving Brooklyn judges); Leslie Eaton, Behind a
Troubled Bench, an Arcane Way of Picking Judges, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2003, at B1
(detailing the scandals involving Brooklyn judges, and the "cronyism and political
connections" on which judicial selection in New York City is based); David Hafetz, Bill Would
Extend Campaign Finance Laws to Judge Candidates, N.Y. SUN, June 10, 2004, at 3
(reporting that city lawmakers responded'to allegations of corruption in the judiciary in
Brooklyn by proposing legislation that would limit party participation in judicial selection).
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snapshot, it is a diverse-in every way imaginable-nominating
commission that solicits and interviews applicants and produces a
list of approved candidates to the Executive from which the
Executive must select." So, if we were a nominating commission
and we were told there was a vacancy on a particular court, we
would solicit people to apply, conduct interviews, vet the candidates,
call references, et cetera. We would be doing all that we could to
learn about them. At the end of the process, we would submit a
prescribed number of candidates to the appointing authority (i.e.,
Governor or Mayor), with the proviso that the appointment must
come from the list we provided. That, in a nutshell, is the sort of
merit system that I am advocating.
To be fair, especially for those of you who are not steeped in this
issue, this is what might be described as tilting at windmills. Merit
selection is not on the immediate horizon. It is no small feat to get
elected legislatures to support appointed judiciaries, especially
when elected judgeships are one of the last great bastions of
political patronage. The American Bar Association, historically
such a staunch supporter of merit selection, recently has made
statements like: "Well, we don't know that merit selection is coming
anytime soon, so in the meantime let's figure out ways to improve
elections. 25  In New York State, we have had the comprehensive
work and report of the Feerick Commission, which was created by
Chief Judge Judith Kaye.26 The Feerick Commission focused on
ways to improve judicial elections. That, for sure, is commendable,
but it is certainly ironic that the Chair, John Feerick, has for years
been one of the most ardent and eloquent supporters of merit
selection.27 While there is a sense that merit selection might not
happen anytime soon and that, therefore, judicial elections need to
be cleaned up, I suggest to you that what this debate really is about
24 See Zeidman, supra note 7, at 831-32 (outlining a proposed merit selection procedure).
25 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY JUDICIARY, at v-vi (2003)
(maintaining a preference for an appointive system, but nevertheless listing several proposed
reforms for judicial elections).
26 Chief Judge Kaye took the occasion of her 2003 State of the Judiciary address to
announce the formation of the Commission to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial
Elections, chaired by John D. Feerick, former Dean of Fordham University School of Law.
See John Caher, Kaye Vows to Pursue Reform Even if Forced to Go it Alone: Commission Will
Explore Judicial Campaign Funding, Ethics, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 2003, at 1.
27 In 1987, John Feerick was appointed to chair the Commission on Government Integrity.
See GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE 1990S: THE COLLECTED REPORTS OF THE NEW
YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY 3 (Bruce A. Green ed., 1991). The
Commission recommended, inter alia, a switch from judicial elections to judicial
appointments. Id. at 299-301.
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is, again: how do we want to select judges? What system would we
implement if we were starting with a clean slate? While tinkering
with elections through reforms, such as public financing 8 and
campaign contribution limits,2 9 will improve the campaign process,
it will by no means address the myriad problems associated with
judicial elections. Instead, we should think large and try and devise
the best system possible. If we approach the issue that way, with
that goal, I am confident we will end up with merit selection.
The merit selection process is less political and therefore more
independent than elections. Again, it is not a perfect system, but it
is for sure less political. Here is a fact: anybody can apply to a merit
selection system. Anybody. I witnessed that firsthand when I had
the privilege of serving on one of these nominating commissions in
New York City.3 ° People who had practiced law for twenty years
but who had no political background could, and did, apply. They
were considered and several of them were appointed. On the other
hand, if you have been practicing for twenty years, but have no
political party backing or experience, you are wasting your time if
you consider trying to enter the judicial election fray. I think that is
just a fact.
Moving away from the process questions, let me spend just two or
three minutes on the yield. Which system produces a more
qualified and inclusive judiciary? It is very difficult to measure, but
I think this is where social science can help. Which process do you
think yields a better judiciary? Just asking the question sends up
red flags. Nobody wants to debate that. In fact, those who support
elections are quick to aver that elected judges are "just as good" as
appointed judges. Yet, we have not defined what that means. "Just
as good" meaning they have just as much integrity? How do you
measure a quality like integrity? As I searched for ways to obtain
data, I settled on two measures: misconduct and diversity. They
have their own flaws, their own issues, but they paint a clear and
telling picture. Those are variables capable of being measured
28 For discussions of public financing of judicial campaigns, see, e.g., Richard Briffault,
Public Funds and the Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 819 (2002); Charles
Gardner Geyh, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467
(2001).
29 For discussions of campaign contribution limits and judicial elections, see, e.g., David
Barnhizer, "On the Make': Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the American Judiciary,
50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361 (2001); Erwin Chemerinksy, Preserving an Independent Judiciary:
The Need for Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 133 (1998).
" The author served as a member of New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's Advisory
Committee on the Judiciary from 1993 to 1996.
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empirically. We can debate the meaning of the numbers, but you
can get your hands on them. So, again, looking at twenty-five years
of judicial elections and appointment in New York City, I looked at
the number of judges who were sanctioned for judicial misconduct.
I then charted it out to compare the proportion of appointed judges
versus elected judges. In over twenty-five years, it is remarkably
consistent that in New York City the elected judiciary has the
dubious distinction of far surpassing the appointed judiciary on the
variable of judicial misconduct.31
The next variable I looked at was diversity. As you look at a
statewide snapshot-and frankly, now I wish I had something to
post on the board-it is remarkable. When you look throughout
New York State today-not twenty-five years ago-our elected
judiciary is overwhelmingly white males.3 2 There are elected courts
in this state, such as the 108 judges of the County Court, that are
virtually entirely white.33 So, I suggest to you that a merit selection
system better promotes diversity. And recall the variables that I
began with: qualified, inclusive and independent. On all these
scores, all of them, merit selection is far superior.
A caveat to the issue of diversity, which I would be remiss if I did
not mention, is, ironically, one source of opposition to merit
selection is the Black and Latino Caucus of the state legislature.
Why? There are actually two traditional arguments. One is: "You
are changing the rules of the game when we are in a position,
finally, to vote in more people of color. We finally have some
amount of political strength and we intend to exercise it." The other
argument is that merit selection is an elitist old boy's network that
serves to perpetuate the status quo. What those concerns highlight
is that any merit selection system is only as good as its nominating
commission, which must be diverse itself-and I mean "diverse"
defined in multiple ways-and must have as a priority the goal of
diversifying the judiciary.
In conclusion, on both process and yield measures, merit selection
is superior to judicial elections. I will leave for another day a
discussion of what it would take for merit selection to become the
norm, and what an ideal merit selection system would look like.
Thank you.
31 Zeidman, supra note 7, at 808-10.
32 Id. at 816-17 (indicating that white judges constitute more than eighty percent of the
state judiciary).
33 id.
20051

